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DOUBLE, DOUBLE, TOIL AND TROUBLE:
JUSTICE-TALK AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver*
I said there is no justice as they led me out the door
And the Judge said
“This isn’t a court of justice, son.
This is a court of law.”1
INTRODUCTION
It’s not easy being a lawyer.  “Biglaw” may not be dead (yet), but
major firms have dissolved, filed for bankruptcy, and shed partners
and practice groups.2  Small and mid-sized firms and solo practitioners
are facing similar challenges.  Some of these developments are attribu-
table to the financial crisis and the Great Recession.  Others are the
result of structural and technological changes affecting the market for
legal services—and those changes have revealed new weaknesses in
the business forms through which lawyers have traditionally delivered
legal services.
To most inhabitants of Biglaw, these changes and challenges are un-
precedented, but to lawyers who do medical malpractice and personal
injury litigation, market turbulence of this sort is old hat.  Over the
past three decades, there have been dramatic changes in the market
(and demand) for such services.  Some of these changes are clearly
attributable to legislative action.  For example, many states have made
lawsuits less profitable for victims of malpractice and their lawyers by
capping noneconomic or total damages.  States have also made these
lawsuits more expensive by putting procedural hurdles (including
screening panels, certification requirements, and interlocutory appeals
of expert witness reports) in the path that plaintiffs must follow to
* David A. Hyman is H. Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine,
University of Illinois. Tel. 217-333-0061, e-mail: dhyman@illinois.edu.  Charles Silver is McDon-
ald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure, University of Texas Law School.  Tel. 512-232-1337, e-
mail: csilver@law.utexas.edu.
1. BILLY BRAGG, Rotting on Remand, on WORKERS PLAYTIME (Elektra/Asylum Records
1988).
2. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 751.
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secure a recovery.  The negative impact of these initiatives on litiga-
tion rates was predictable.  But, even in states that have not taken
such sweeping steps, there has been a long-term secular decline in the
volume of medical malpractice litigation.
Apart from the highly visible public brawl over the merits of dam-
age caps, these developments have attracted little attention.  How-
ever, the dynamics are clear to those who wish to pay attention to
them.  In this Article, we explore these trends, highlight the ways in
which they have interacted with one another, and then briefly discuss
why it is not helpful to analyze these developments in terms of their
impact on “access to justice.” Part II identifies five developments that
have affected the economics of plaintiff-side medical malpractice liti-
gation—all in the direction of making such cases less remunerative.
Part III explains why, despite routine practice to the contrary, we
should stop talking about these developments in terms of their impact
on “access to justice.”  Part IV concludes.
II. FIVE FACTORS THAT HAVE AFFECTED THE ECONOMICS OF
PLAINTIFF-SIDE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
A. Damage Caps
Damage caps have been the most popular tort reform of the twenti-
eth century (and, so far, the twenty-first century).  As we have de-
tailed elsewhere, roughly thirty states have adopted a diverse array of
damage caps.3  Some states cap only noneconomic damages.  Some
states cap total damages.  Some states cap both.  The severity of these
caps varies, depending on the absolute dollar amount of the cap,
whether it is adjusted for inflation (and if not, when the cap was en-
acted), and whether it varies by the number and type of defendants.
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the caps that are in effect as of June
2013.
3. David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Estimating the Effect
of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355,
356 (2009).
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TABLE 1: STATUTORY DAMAGE CAPS4
State (*inflation
adjusted) Cap Type Cap Level
Louisiana Total $500k plus future medical expenses
New Mexico Total $600k plus future medical expenses
Colorado Total $1M total; $300k noneconomic
Noneconomic
Indiana Total $1.25M
Massachusetts Total (hospitals), $20k total (nonprofit hospitals); $500k noneconomic
Noneconomic (all defendants)
(all)
Nebraska Total $1.75M
Virginia* Total $1.95M
California Noneconomic $250k
Idaho*
Kansas
Montana
Oklahoma* Noneconomic $300k
West Virginia* Noneconomic $250k, except $500k in death cases
Missouri Noneconomic $330k
Texas Noneconomic $250k–$750k, depending on number and type of
defendants
Nevada Noneconomic $350k
Ohio Noneconomic Greater of $250k or (3x economic damages, up to
$500k)
Hawaii Noneconomic $375k
Alaska Noneconomic $400k
Utah* Noneconomic $409k
Michigan* Noneconomic $641k
Georgia Noneconomic $350k–$1.05M, depending on number and type of
South Carolina defendants
Mississippi Noneconomic $500k
North Dakota
South Dakota
Maryland* Noneconomic $650k
Florida Noneconomic $500k ($1M in death and other serious injury cases)
Wisconsin Noneconomic $750k
Do these damage caps matter?  If so, how much do they matter?  Do
they simply reduce payouts per claim, or do they also affect claim vol-
ume by making small-value claims less remunerative?  Figure 1, drawn
from other work we have done using Texas closed claims data, shows
4. Id. at 393–94 tbl. 11.
550 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:547
the impact of Texas’s moderately strict 2003 cap on noneconomic
damages.5
FIGURE 16 TIME TRENDS IN TEXAS MED MAL CLAIMS AND
PAYOUTS, 1990–2010
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
pa
yo
ut
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 (r
ea
l 2
01
0$
)
cl
ai
m
s p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
claims per 100,000 population (left-axis) med mal payout per capita (right-axis)
As Figure 1 reflects, we observe a 61% decline in paid claims, and a
45% decline in payouts per capita during the post-reform period (i.e.,
comparing 2009 with 2003).  Since plaintiffs’ lawyers generally charge
a contingency fee of one-third of the amount recovered, the combined
effect is a 75% reduction in the amount of money received by plain-
tiffs—and a comparable reduction in the fees received by their law-
yers.   Other work has similarly shown that damage caps have a
substantial impact on claiming and payouts, although the evidence is
less clear for studies that do not account for tort reform’s phase-in
effects.7
5. See David A. Hyman, Charles Silver, Bernard S. Black & Myungho Paik, Does Tort Re-
form Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas 7 fig. 1 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Law,
Behavior, and Social Science Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LBSS12-12, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047433.
6. Claims per 100,000 population by year for all claimants (left-axis), and payouts per capita
(right-axis), for 14,995 non-duplicate, non-nursing-home, medical malpractice cases closed from
1990–2009 with payout > $25,000 in 1988 dollars.  Texas tort reform in 2003 is depicted by the
vertical line.  Amounts are in 2008 dollars.
7. See Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical Mal-
practice Litigation: Part 2—Effect of Damage Caps, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 639 (2013).
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B. Caps on Attorney Fees
Caps on attorney fees have attracted far less attention than damage
caps, but sixteen states have adopted them.  Cap design varies, but
most provide that lawyers can only charge a declining contingency fee
as the size of the recovery increases.  Table 2 provides a brief sum-
mary of the fee caps in each state and for claims brought pursuant to
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
TABLE 2: STATUTORY CAPS ON CONTINGENCY FEES8
State Fee-Limit Rule
California Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $50,000; 1/3 of next $50,000; 25%
of next $500,000; and 15% of damages exceeding $600,000
Connecticut Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $300,000; 25% of next $300,000;
20% of next $300,000; 15% of next $300,000; and 10% of damages
exceeding $1.2 million
Delaware Sliding scale, not to exceed 35% of the first $100,000 recovered; 25% of
the next $100,000; and 10% of the balance
Florida Sliding scale, not to exceed 30% of first $250,000; 10% of any award over
$250,000
Illinois 1/3 of amount recovered (in effect since 2013). Previously, sliding scale on
medical malpractice cases, not to exceed 1/3 of first $150,000; 25% of
$150,000 to $1 million; 20% of damages over $1 million
Indiana No limit on first $250,000; no more than 15% on amounts above $250,000
Maine Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $100,000; 25% of next $100,000; and
20% of damages exceeding $200,000
Massachusetts Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $150,000; 1/3 of next $150,000;
30% of next $200,000; and 25% of award over $500,000
Michigan 1/3 of amount recovered
Nevada Sliding scale, not to exceed 40% of first $50,000; 1/3 of next $50,000; 25%
of next $500,000; 15% of any amount over $600,000
New Jersey Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $500,000; 30% of next $500,000;
25% of third $500,000; and 20% of fourth $500,000
New York Sliding scale, not to exceed 30% of first $250,000; 25% of second $250,000;
20% of next $500,000; 15% of next $250,000; 10% over $1.25 million
Oklahoma 50% of net judgment
Tennessee 1/3 of award
Utah 1/3 of award
Wisconsin Sliding scale, not to exceed 1/3 of first $1 million; 20% of any amount
exceeding $1 million
FTCA 20% of administrative settlements, and 25% of a judgment or compromise
after suit is filed
8. David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, The Economics of Plaintiff-Side
Personal Injury Practice 10 tbl. 2 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Law, Behavior, and Social Science
Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LBSS13-28, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1441487.
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We have been unable to locate any empirical research quantifying
the impact of these fee caps.  In other work, using a dataset comprised
of plaintiff-side personal injury firms located in diverse states, we
found that the probable impact of these fee caps would vary greatly,
depending on both the details of cap design and the portfolio of cases
handled by the firm.9  Table 3 summarizes the “haircut” that the three
of the firms in our dataset (located in Illinois, Texas, and an undis-
closed third state) would take if the caps imposed by three states (Cal-
ifornia, Florida, and pre-2013 Illinois) had been applied to all of their
cases.
TABLE 3: IMPACT OF FEE CAPS ON FIRM REVENUE10
Firm Fee Cap
Illinois
California Florida (pre-2013)
Illinois Firm 27% 45% 18%
Texas Firm 26% 40% 19%
Firm in Undisclosed State 7% 17% 5%
As Table 3 makes clear, a fee cap can have dramatically different ef-
fects when it is applied to firms with different case portfolios.  Califor-
nia’s fee cap reduces the third firm’s fees by only 7%, but it reduces
the fees for the Illinois and Texas firms by 27% and 26%, respec-
tively—meaning there is more than a four-fold difference in the hair-
cut on fees imposed on these firms by the same fee cap.  Similarly,
different fee caps can have dramatically different impacts when they
are applied to the same firm.  For example, the Texas firm would see a
19% haircut on its fees from the Illinois cap, but a 40% haircut from
the Florida cap.
To be sure, Table 3 oversimplifies matters.  The fee caps only apply
to medical malpractice cases.  But the firms we studied handled di-
verse types of cases, some of which did not involve medical malprac-
tice.  Because we applied the cap to all cases alike, our results
overstate the likely impact of the fee caps.  We also assume that fee
caps do not affect case volume or case mix (i.e., we assume that firms
continue to represent the same clients and seek the same damages)
but that assumption is obviously unrealistic.  By making cases less re-
munerative, fee caps discourage lawyers from taking some (or many)
cases they would have otherwise accepted.  The assumption of “no
impact on case selection” biases our results downward.  We think it
9. See id. at 3, 25–26.
10. Id. at 23 tbl. 10.
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likely that the volume or case selection effect is larger than the non-
medical malpractice case cap effect.  If so, Table 3 underestimates the
impact of fee caps on firm revenue.
Fee caps and damage caps are designed to bite hard only in the
largest cases—and such cases typically constitute only a small fraction
of plaintiffs’ firms’ dockets.  So, why do fee caps and damage caps
have such a large impact?  The business model for plaintiffs’ firms
provides an obvious answer.  For the law firms we have studied, and
for firms studied by others, a minority of very large cases accounts for
an enormous fraction of total revenues.  The top 10% of cases han-
dled by a plaintiff’s firm (based on the amount of the recovery) can
account for 50% or more of the firm’s entire revenue.  Policies that
make these cases significantly less remunerative destabilize the basic
economics of these firms and, more generally, of plaintiff-side
practice.
C. Secular Decline
Apart from the developments mentioned above, in other research
we found a long-term secular decline in the frequency of medical mal-
practice litigation, even in states that have not adopted caps on dam-
ages or fees.11  Between 2001 and 2012, we found a 50% decline in
claim frequency (paid claims per 1000 physicians) in states that did not
have a cap in effect during this period, compared to a 62% decline in
states that adopted caps during the 1990s, and a 47% decline in states
that adopted caps during the 1970s and 1980s.12  Thus, for reasons that
have nothing to do with tort reform, we are seeing fewer paid medical
malpractice claims, even as health care spending and treatment inten-
sity rise inexorably.
D. Subrogation
Subrogation has had an increasingly significant impact on the eco-
nomics of plaintiff-side litigation.  Subrogation allows a plaintiff’s
health insurer (including Medicare, Medicaid, and workers’ compen-
sation insurers) to recoup the amounts they paid to (or on behalf of)
the injured plaintiff from funds received in settlement of the plaintiff’s
tort claim.  The logic of subrogation is straightforward.  Health insur-
ers advance funds to pay for the cost of treating patients injured by
negligence.  When patients sue for medical malpractice, the damages
11. Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical Mal-
practice Litigation: Part 1—National Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612 (2013).
12. Id. at 618 tbl. 1.  States that adopted caps in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s are starting from a
lower baseline; the percentage decline is relative to that lower baseline.
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they recover reflect (in whole or in part) the cost of the additional
medical services they required because of the malpractice. If patients
kept all the money, they would be reimbursed for costs that were actu-
ally borne by someone else—namely, their first-party health care in-
surer.  This would be inequitable and would also make first-party
coverage more expensive than it would be if payers were reimbursed.
Consequently, first-party insurers use their contracts to step into the
shoes of injured patients and recover their losses.
This description of insurer subrogation seems simple and intuitively
obvious, but it masks a dynamic that makes litigation progressively
less remunerative for injured patients and their lawyers.  Throughout
the United States and over many decades, health care costs have risen
dramatically.  By contrast, the amount of liability insurance health
care providers carry to cover malpractice claims has not kept pace.13
In real dollars, malpractice coverage has declined, and it continues to
be eroded by inflation.  Because medical malpractice cases rarely set-
tle for amounts that exceed providers’ primary policy limits, rising
medical costs and diminishing policy limits whipsaw injured patients,
who find less and less money left over after reimbursing their first-
party insurers.
This development has predictable effects.  First, plaintiffs with large
subrogated damages are less likely to pursue litigation, since they will
be left with little to show for their lawsuit after their lawyer and the
subrogated insurer are paid.  Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers will become
reluctant to take cases with large subrogated damages.  This is due, in
part, to the costs and uncertainties of dealing with subrogated insurers
who have no preexisting contractual obligation to pay the lawyer for
securing the funds they receive.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ norms also cut
against taking such cases.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys see their mission as re-
covering compensation for injured people.  They do not see them-
selves as subrogation lawyers for insurers, and they are reluctant to
take cases when they know there is little they can do to help their
clients.
E. Attacking the Expert
Medical malpractice litigation relies on expert testimony.  Steps that
reduce the supply of physicians who are willing and able to serve as
experts or that otherwise increase the cost of those experts’ services
13. See Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage,
Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims,
1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S9, S10 (2007).
2014] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 555
will affect the costs and feasibility of litigating the underlying malprac-
tice cases.  Three strategies have been used to attack the expert: statu-
tory restrictions on who can serve as an expert, interlocutory appeals
when an expert is accepted by the trial court but the defendant wants
to challenge that decision, and professional discipline against those
with the temerity to offer testimony on behalf of injured plaintiffs.
We address each of these strategies in turn.
1. Limitations on Who Can Be an Expert
Who can testify as an expert?  In Alabama, the expert must be li-
censed in the same specialty as the defendant.14  In Tennessee, the
expert has to come from Tennessee or an adjoining state.15  In West
Virginia, experts must devote at least 60% of their time to clinical
practice or teaching at an accredited university.16  Such restrictions,
over and above the generic requirement that one “has to know
enough about the subject area to qualify as an expert,” reduce the
supply of those able to serve as experts.  In the limiting case, it may be
impossible for a plaintiffs’ attorney to find a doctor who is ready, will-
ing, and able to testify as an expert.  Short of that, legislative measures
that reduce supply enable physicians who qualify as experts under the
more restrictive criteria to charge higher fees.  This increases plain-
tiffs’ attorneys’ out-of-pocket costs, making plaintiff-side litigation
riskier and less profitable.
2. Interlocutory Appeals
Texas requires the submission of an expert report within 120 days of
the initiation of a malpractice suit—and since 2007, has allowed de-
fendants to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the validity of the
expert report.17  If the trial court accepts the expert report, defendants
are allowed to file an immediate appeal, to argue that the proffered
expert does not actually qualify to offer expert testimony, or to argue
that the proffered report does not otherwise satisfy the statutory
requirements.
In general, interlocutory appeals are strongly disfavored, since they
increase costs without much in the way of commensurate benefits.
Unless we believe the costs of a false positive (i.e., allowing a malprac-
tice case to go forward when it should not have) are comparable to the
costs of erroneously certifying a class action, it is hard to conclude that
14. ALA. CODE § 6-5-548(e) (2004).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (2012).
16. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7(a) (1994).
17. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2012).
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routine interlocutory appeals add much value in this setting.  But they
do increase costs and risks for plaintiffs’ lawyers—which was probably
the point.
3. Professional Discipline
Physicians have also used professional discipline to attack those
willing to testify on behalf of plaintiffs.18  The American Association
of Neurological Surgeons (AANS) is a voluntary organization.  One
of its members (Donald C. Austin) testified in a malpractice case
against another member, who then complained to the AANS.  After
an investigation and hearing, the AANS suspended Austin for six
months, reasoning that he had offered irresponsible testimony and
thereby breached his professional obligations as a neurosurgeon.  Dis-
covery in the resulting lawsuit revealed that the AANS had disci-
plined other physicians who had testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but
had never disciplined a physician who testified on behalf of a defen-
dant.  In his usual nonchalant fashion, Judge Richard Posner dismissed
this highly salient fact and upheld summary judgment for the defend-
ants, reasoning that the only complaints that had been made to AANS
had involved neurosurgeons who had testified for plaintiffs, so it was
unsurprising that AANS had only disciplined those who testified for
plaintiffs.19
F. Cumulative Impact of These Factors
Each of these developments affects the larger economics of plain-
tiff-side practice in this area.  Some reduce the potential rewards di-
rectly (e.g., capping damages and fees), while others do so indirectly
(e.g., subrogation and attacking the expert).  Some are both cause and
effect of larger dynamics in the litigation environment (e.g., the secu-
lar trend toward less malpractice litigation).  Even those provisions
that are facially neutral seem likely to disparately impact plaintiffs.20
In combination, the effect is to change the risk–return tradeoff of
many malpractice cases.  Professor Joanna Shepherd sketched out the
basic dynamic:
18. We do not address the parallel use of professional discipline to attack physicians who
serve as medical directors for managed care organizations. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530, 532, 537–38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Morris v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d
364, 365 (D.C. 1997).
19. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001).
20. Of course, limitations on who can serve as an expert are facially neutral, but defendants
are more likely to be able to find a willing expert, even in the shrunken pool.
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As one attorney interviewed for my study noted: “med-mal litiga-
tion is the ‘sport of kings’ from an expense standpoint . . . the liabil-
ity/damages mix must present sufficient strength in both measures
to make economic sense.” Another attorney that participated in my
survey explained that “the cake has to be worth the candle . . . I
know if expenses will be high, I won’t take the case without the
likelihood of a large recovery.”21
Eventually, plaintiffs’ attorneys get the message, and they find other
things to do with their time.  When they leave, so do defense attor-
neys.  “Starve the beast” may not actually work to constrain the
growth of government,22 but it is certainly an effective strategy for
reducing or eliminating capacity in the market for legal services.
III. JUST SAY NO TO JUSTICE-TALK
For many years, the American Bar Association and other worthies
have framed campaigns to improve access to the legal system in terms
of “access to justice.” Numerous studies have been done on unmet
“legal needs.”  Panels and symposia have been held.  Law professors
and titans of the bar have held forth on the subject.  Lawyers have
tried, without much success, to establish a “civil Gideon” right to
counsel in certain types of civil cases.
What do we have to show for all this “justice-talk”?  Victims of
medical malpractice cannot obtain compensation unless they hire an
attorney, or can credibly threaten to do so.23  Damage caps make
many cases non-starters, and disproportionately reduce recoveries in
the largest cases, where victims’ injuries are likely to be the most se-
vere.24  And under-compensation and non-compensation was the rule,
even before damage caps were added to the mix.
21. Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System,
67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 15) (alterations in original), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147915.
22. See, e.g., William Niskanen, Limiting Government: The Failure of “Starve the Beast,” 26
CATO J. 553 (2006); Jonathan Rauch, Stoking the Beast, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 27,
28.
23. We quantified the frequency with which pro se plaintiffs successfully used the tort system
to obtain compensation in Texas.  In all five lines of commercial insurance in our dataset, cases
waged by pro se plaintiffs comprise less than 1% of all paid claims. See Charles Silver & David
A. Hyman, Access to Justice in a World Without Lawyers: Evidence from Texas Bodily Injury
Claims, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 364 (2010).
24. Of course, matters are a bit more complicated.  Large economic damages, which are in-
creasingly common among those who suffer permanent injuries requiring expensive lifetime
medical treatments, are not subject to a cap on noneconomic damages.  This increases the value
of such cases, relative to those in which noneconomic damages predominate.  And noneconomic
damages predominate among non-working women, children, and the elderly.
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In sum, all of this justice-talk has had no apparent impact on access
to legal services for victims of medical malpractice.  There is no evi-
dence to suggest more of the same will change that.  In part, this is
because bar leaders refuse to admit that some of the causes lie close to
home—in the restrictions imposed by state bars on the manner and
means by which legal services can be delivered, including harsh penal-
ties for the unlicensed practice of law.25  But even those lucky enough
to find a lawyer quickly find that the legal system is slow, expensive,
prone to error, and fundamentally inhumane.  To add insult to injury
(and to the baseline of non-compensation and under-compensation of
those suffering injury), the legal system also does a spectacularly me-
diocre job of deterring medical error.
To repeat, it seems unlikely that more justice-talk will remedy any
of these ills.  We know of no state that is considering a wholesale
rollback of its tort reforms, and we know of many that seem inclined
to pile more lawsuit restrictions on top of those already in place.  In
pro-reform states like Texas, it is arguably worse to maintain the fic-
tion that medical malpractice victims can obtain justice through the
tort system than it would be to concede the reality that they often
cannot.
Rather than more justice-talk, we should find a new way to talk
about these issues, and a different strategy for addressing the underly-
ing problems.  For example, tort reform advocates often assert that
liability is an inefficient substitute for first-party insurance coverage of
accident-related losses.  Perhaps it is time to take them at their word
and explore the possibility of making new forms of first-party cover-
age available for tort-related injuries.  Alternatively, maybe it is time
to “make a deal,” swapping federal tort reform (which would cover
the nineteen states that do not currently have a cap on noneconomic
or total damages, and could standardize the varying caps in the other
thirty-one states) in exchange for physician acceptance of payment re-
form, public accountability for performance, and practice
reorganization.26
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the developments highlighted in this Article has affected
the basic economics of plaintiff-side medical malpractice litigation.  In
25. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the Corpo-
rate Practice of Law (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of Law, Center in Law, Economics, and Organ-
ization Research Papers Series, No. C12-16, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2183978.
26. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Let’s Make A Deal: Trading Malpractice Reform for
Health Reform, HEALTH AFF. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with authors).
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combination their effect has been devastating.  To the extent we have
relied on medical malpractice to compensate negligently injured pa-
tients and deter negligent treatment, the developments highlighted in
this Article indicate it is long past time to look elsewhere.
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